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This paper sets out to explore the extent to which perceptions regarding the ‘badness’ of 
different types of deaths differ according to how those deaths are ‘labelled’ in the elicitation 
procedure.  In particular, we are interested in whether responses to ‘contextual’ questions – 
where the specific context in which the deaths occur is known – differ from ‘generic’ 
questions – where the context is unknown.  Further, we set out to test whether sensitivity to 
the numbers of deaths differs across the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ versions of the questions.  
We uncover evidence to suggest that both the perceived ‘badness’ of different types of deaths 
and sensitivity to the numbers of deaths may differ according to whether ‘generic’ or 
‘contextual’ descriptions are used.  
Qualitative data suggested two reasons why responses to ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions 
differed: firstly, some influential variables were omitted from the ‘generic’ descriptions and 
secondly, certain variables were interpreted somewhat differently once the context had been 
identified. The implications of our findings for ‘generic’ questions, such as those commonly 
used in health economics (for example, the EQ 5D), are discussed.  
 
J.E.L. classification codes: H5, I10 
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BACKGROUND 
 
People regard some deaths as worse than others.
(1) For example, research has shown people 
are more concerned about cancer deaths than deaths from heart disease, motor vehicle 
accidents, household fires, or airplane accidents.
(2,3) Likewise deaths caused by industrial air 
pollution are regarded as more deserving of resources than deaths caused by smoking or 
automobile accidents.
(4) Hence, it would appear that just as the acceptability of risks can be 
characterized by “qualitative” factors,
(5) public concern about deaths might be aggravated by 
certain underlying features of those deaths.  
 
As noted by Sunstein
(1) the risk perception literature does suggest reasons why people might 
regard some deaths as worse than others. More specifically, as well as the notion of livable 
life-years (i.e., it is worse if a child is killed than an older adult), he highlights the importance 
of ‘dread’ (i.e., death preceded by unusual pain and suffering), blameworthiness (i.e., 
responsibility for death lies with a third party), distributional equity (i.e., victims are members 
of socially disadvantaged groups), and high externalities (i.e., catastrophic events involving 
widespread non-pecuniary losses). For example, cancer deaths might be more “dreaded” that 
deaths from heart disease because they are preceded by a longer period of pain and suffering, 
whereas people who die from industrial air pollution are less to blame than smokers are for 
their deaths.  
 
If people’s concerns about deaths can be captured by a set of underlying attributes such as 
these the next step would be to quantify their importance. This type of quantification would 
then allow more general conclusions to be drawn about the ‘bad deaths’ premium that people 
place on different types of deaths according to their underlying features rather than to their 
specific identity. However, before attempting such a quantification we need to make sure that   3
people’s concerns for different types of deaths can be adequately captured by the ‘generic’ 
attributes used to describe the deaths. The research published in this paper explored this issue 
for deaths that were described using four of Sunstein’s attributes – the age of the victim 
(livable life-years), the severity and duration of the victim’s pain and suffering in the period 
leading up to their death (dread), and who is most to blame for the victim’s death 
(blameworthiness). More specifically, the aim of the study was to test how well people’s 
concerns towards these attributes only – ‘generic’ descriptions of deaths – matched with their 
concerns towards descriptions where the specific cause of death is also identified (for 
example, as a driver in a car accident) – ‘contextual’ descriptions.  
 
Literature from a related area, health state utility measurement, gives us reason to suspect that 
the revelation of the identity or ‘labelling’ of the cause of death might make a difference. For 
example, Sackett and Torrance
(6) found that adding a label to a health state description 
significantly affected the utility values obtained: ‘tuberculosis’ was given a higher value than 
‘unnamed contagious disease’, whereas ‘mastectomy for breast cancer’ was given a lower 
value than 'mastectomy for injury'. Gerard et al.
(7) also found differences when the word 
‘cancer’ was used and when descriptions were written in the third party. Likewise, Rabin et 
al.
(8) and Robinson and Bryan
(9)  report that adding a label significantly affected valuations of 
both physical and mental conditions, but found differences in the direction of these effects.   
 
Of course, evidence that responses to ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ descriptions are different, 
does not, in itself, imply that one description is somehow superior to the other.  Before 
reaching such a conclusion, as well as considering the purpose to which the responses are to 
be put (we return to this issue in the discussion), we need to establish which set of responses 
is the more valid. One objective criterion against which to assess the validity of responses is   4
to test the sensitivity to a theoretically relevant factor that should influence people’s concern 
such as the number of deaths caused by a particular type of death (see Loomes
(10)). Sensitivity 
to the numbers dying, therefore, offers a test of the validity of responses to both ‘generic’ and 
‘contextual’ descriptions.  
 
To sum up, the aim of our study was to explore the extent to which perceptions regarding the 
‘badness’ of different types of deaths differ according to whether ‘generic’ or ‘contextual’ 
descriptions were used, where deaths are ‘labelled’ in the ‘contextual’ descriptions.  Further, 
we set out to test whether sensitivity to the numbers of deaths differed across the ‘generic’ 





Discussion groups of between 8 and 12 participants were convened in the North East and East 
Anglia regions of the UK. A total of 313 participants were recruited to take part on a quota 
basis to be broadly representative of the gender, age and social class profile of the general 
population. The demographic characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Group Meetings 
The group discussions began with a brief introduction to the aims of the study and 
participants were asked to answer in their capacity as citizens. It was emphasized that the 
research would provide guidance to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) about whether   5
members of the public wanted more effort and resources to the put towards preventing some 
sorts of deaths than others. More specifically, they were told that the HSE were interested in 
finding out whether they wanted to take into account factors like the age of the victims, how 
much and for how long their quality of life is affected in the period leading up to their deaths, 
or who is primarily to blame for the deaths.  
 
Following the introduction participants were presented with a series of questions, each of 
which presented them with two premature death scenarios, labelled A and B, which varied on 
one or more of the five attributes shown below: 
•  The numbers of people who die (either 10, 15, 25, or 50) 
•  Their typical age (under 17s, 17-40s, 40-60s, or over 60s) 
•  How much their quality of life is affected in the period leading up to their deaths (either a 
bit worse than normal or a lot worse than normal) 
•  How long their quality of life is affected in the period leading up to their deaths (either a 
few minutes, a couple of weeks, 1-2 years, or 3-5 years) 
•  Who is most to blame for the deaths (the individuals themselves, other individuals, 
business/government or nobody in particular) 
 
The two premature death scenarios used in each question were presented in tabular form as 
shown in the example presented in Figure 1. In each question participants were asked to rate 
which of the two types of deaths they thought was the worst by ticking one of four possible 
responses, namely: A is much worse than B; A is slightly worse than B; B is slightly worse 
than A; or B is much worse than A.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE   6
Participants were presented with a total of 28 questions like this. Five of these questions were 
practice questions in which one attribute was varied at a time and 12 questions made up a 
discrete-choice experiment that was used to estimate the weights of each attribute – the details 
of which is reported elsewhere (Robinson et al.
(11)).  We report here the 11 questions that set 
out to explore the impact on responses of providing participants with information about the 
specific causes of the deaths over and above information about the deaths in terms of the five 
attributes described above. Six of these questions involved scenarios where the specific 
causes of death were not provided – we call these the ‘generic’ questions. These six ‘generic’ 
questions were presented along with the 12 questions which were used for the discrete choice 
experiment in Part 1 of the questionnaire. Two of the six ‘generic’ questions were identical to 
one another and were presented as the 6
th and 21
st questions, providing a test-retest reliability 
check on responses to ‘generic’ questions. In Part 2 of the questionnaire the five different 
‘generic’ scenarios were presented again but this time the specific causes of death were also 
presented – we call these the ‘contextual’ questions. For example the causes of death provided 
for the ‘generic’ question shown in Figure 1 were ‘deaths from lung cancer caused by 
smoking’ for A and ‘deaths from asbestos-related cancer’ for B. 
 
Three versions of the questionnaire were produced each of which used different types of 
deaths for the five ‘generic’/‘contextual’ question pairings. The ‘contextual’ questions used in 
each version are shown in Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Between the three versions eight different causes of deaths were used to reflect the range of 
variation on the attributes (i.e., car drivers, pedestrians, rail passengers, cancer caused by   7
smoking, cancer caused by asbestos, cancer caused in the workplace, accidents at work, breast 
cancer and carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning). These causes of deaths were paired up in a 
total of seven different ways (car drivers vs. rail passengers, car drivers vs. pedestrians, 
pedestrians vs. breast cancer, work-related cancer vs. car drivers, accidents at work vs. car 
drivers, CO poisoning vs. accidents at work, and smoking cancer vs. asbestos cancer). 
 
All the pairings were included in two of the three versions apart from car drivers vs. rail 
passengers which was included in all three versions and used in its ‘generic’ form as the 
repeated question for the test-retest reliability check.  However, as shown in Figure 2 the level 
of the number of deaths attribute was different for each pairing between the versions. 
These questions can be thought of as falling into one of two categories. In some cases, 
evidence from piloting suggested which way a weighting would go, and the objective was to 
get some indication of the strength of that weighting. For example, we knew from piloting 
that deaths from asbestos-related cancer would be given more weight than deaths from lung 
cancer attributed to the individuals themselves being smokers. So the numbers in both the 
smoking cancer vs asbestos cancer comparisons were increased in the same direction, in one 
case in the ratio 1.5:1 and in the other case in the ratio 2:1; likewise for work-related cancers 
vs car drivers and for accidents at work vs car drivers. This variation therefore enabled us to 
test whether respondents’ ratings were equally sensitive to the different ratios of deaths in the 
‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ versions of each pairing.  
 
However, for pedestrians vs breast cancer, CO poisoning vs accidents at work and pedestrians 
vs car drivers the numbers were counterbalanced (i.e. appeared in the ratios of 1:1.6 and 1.6 
:1) in each direction because we had no strong priors. 
   8
Respondents had not been asked to explain their decisions for the ‘generic’ questions, but for 
each of the ‘contextual’ questions a box was provided at the bottom of the page and 
respondents were invited to write a sentence or two giving their reasons for their answers. 
 
In summary, the questionnaire contained the following four main parts:   
1)  A test-retest reliability check. 
2)  A test of the differences between the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ responses. 
3)  A test of the sensitivity to different ratios of deaths in the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ 
responses. 
4)  Thematic qualitative analysis of the written reasons given to the ‘contextual’ 
questions. 
The test-retest reliability check was designed to check that any observed differences were due 
to a genuine difference between the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ responses, and not an artifact 
of the questions being asked twice.  The second set of tests were designed to check the degree 
of any differences between the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ responses. The third set of tests 
were designed to check if the ratings were equally sensitive to the different ratios of deaths in 
the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ versions of each pairing, and allowed us to consider if the 
‘contextual’ question led to different weights on the attributes presented in each pair. Finally 
the thematic qualitative analysis allowed us to examine why participants’ preferences might 
have been different between the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ versions of each pairing.  
 
Analysis 
In the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions the four response categories were scored 1-4, i.e., 
1= A is much worse than B, 2= A is slightly worse than B, 3=B is slightly worse than A, 4=B 
is much worse than A.  The data were therefore ordinal where a low score means that people   9
think A is worse than B and a high score means that people think B is worse than A. Both the 
test-retest reliability check and comparisons of the responses to the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ 
questions required within-subject tests of differences between responses. We therefore used 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests to test whether the responses to the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ 
questions were significantly different from one another.  
 
To test whether responses were significantly different when different ratios of numbers of 
deaths were presented required between-subject tests. We therefore used either Kruskall-
Wallis (when three versions were compared) or Mann-Whitney tests (when two versions were 
compared) to test whether the responses to each question were significantly different between 
the versions of the questionnaire. 
 
 Thematic qualitative analysis was conducted on the written reasons that participants gave 





1) Test-retest Reliability Check 
Table 2 summarises the results for the repeated ‘generic’ question that was asked twice in Part 
1 of the questionnaire at Q6 and Q21. We report the percentages of respondents giving ratings 
from 1 (A is much worse than B) to 4 (B is much worse than A), the means and standard 
deviations of the ratings, and the Z statistic obtained from the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
Although the results show that the variance in responses and proportions rating B as ‘much 
worse’ than A appear to be slightly lower for Q21 than Q6 (i.e., standard deviations 0.86 vs.   10
0.99; 35.6% vs. 41.2%), the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test showed that there was no significant 
difference in the distributions of responses between Q6 and Q21. The test-retest reliability of 
the ‘generic’ questions was therefore of an acceptable level. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
2) Differences between responses to ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions 
Table 3 summarises the results, aggregated across versions, for the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ 
questions for those pairings where the ratios of numbers were increased in the same direction 
in all versions of the questionnaire. We did not consider it meaningful to aggregate responses 
to questions where the numbers of deaths were ‘counterbalanced’ (but see Table 4 for the 
disaggregated results for these questions).    
 
For each of the seven pairings from which we obtained responses from both ‘generic’ and 
‘contextual’ questions we report the percentages of respondents giving ratings from 1 (A is 
much worse than B) to 4 (B is much worse than A), the means and standard deviations of the 
ratings, and the Z statistic obtained from the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
No significant differences in the distributions of responses were found for Accidents at work 
vs. Car Drivers – where the majority regarded deaths from Accidents at Work as worse than 
Car Driver deaths in both the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ versions (77.2% vs. 80.5%).     
Significant differences were, however, found for the remaining 3 pairings for which these 
comparisons could be made. 
   11
Car Drivers vs. Rail Passengers: Although similar percentages of respondents regarded rail 
passenger deaths as worse than car driver deaths in both the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ 
versions (80.0% and 82.4%), the ‘contextual’ version produced a lower proportion of ‘slightly 
worse than’ (28.8% vs. 44.4%) and higher proportion of ‘much worse than’ responses (53.6% 
vs. 35.6%). 
Work-related Cancer vs. Car Drivers: Just over 20% more respondents regarded work-related 
cancer deaths as worse than car drivers deaths in the ‘contextual’ version than the ‘generic’ 
version (90.3% vs. 68.3%). 
Smoking Cancer vs. Asbestos Cancer: About 10% more respondents regarded asbestos cancer 
deaths as worse than smoking cancer deaths in the ‘contextual’ version than the ‘generic’ 
version (73.4% vs. 69.2%) and the proportion of ‘much worse than’ responses were also 
higher (51.7% vs. 28.4%). 
 
As indicated above, for three of the pairings: Pedestrians vs. Breast Cancer, Car Drivers vs. 
Pedestrians, CO Poisoning vs. Accidents at Work, the number dying by each cause were 
‘counterbalanced’ across versions of the questionnaires (i.e. appeared both as 1.6:1 and 1:1.6). 
As it is not meaningful to aggregate responses to these questions, Table 4 therefore reports 
responses for these pairings at an individual question level.  
 
Table 4 shows that in 2 of the 3 pairings considered there are significant differences between 
the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ responses. Only in the case of Pedestrians vs. Breast Cancer are 
the differences between the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ responses equivocal, with agreement 
between ‘contextual’ and ‘generic’ responses in one of the two pairings and disagreement in 
the other. 
   12
These findings lead us to the conclusion that people’s responses to ‘generic’ questions in 
which the causes of death are represented by attributes only are not completely predictive of 
their responses to ‘contextual’ questions which provide additional information about the 
specific causes of death. 
 
3) Sensitivity to different ratios of deaths in the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions 
For these tests the ratios of deaths in the questions were increased between the versions of the 
questionnaire depending on which pairing of scenarios was used (see Figure 2). 
(i)  1:1 vs. 1.5:1 vs. 2.5:1 – Car Drivers vs. Rail Accidents. 
(ii)  1.5:1 vs. 2:1 - Smoking Cancer vs. Asbestos Cancer; or 1:1.5 vs. 1:2 – Accidents 
at Work vs. Car Drivers and Work-related Cancer vs. Car Drivers. 
Table 5 summarises the results for these comparisons. We report the percentages of 
respondents giving ratings from 1 (A is much worse than B) to 4 (B is much worse than A), 
the means and standard deviations of the ratings, and the chi-square (χ
2) or Z statistics 
obtained from the Kruskall-Wallis or Mann-Whitney U tests.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results show that although participants’ responses were equally sensitive or insensitive to 
the different ratios in both the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions in two of the four pairings 
(Car Drivers vs. Rail Passengers, Accidents at Work vs. Car Drivers), sensitivity to the ratios 
was affected by providing information about the specific causes of death in the other two 
pairings. However, the way in which providing this information affected sensitivity was not 
the same. For one pairings the sensitivity seems to have been greater in the ‘contextual’   13
questions than the ‘generic’ questions (Work-related Cancer vs. Car Drivers), with the 
opposite result for the other pairing (Smoking Cancer vs. Asbestos Cancer). 
 
Overall, there was therefore no systematic tendency for the responses to the ‘generic’ 
questions to be any more or less valid than those to the ‘contextual’ questions. So we cannot 
draw any definitive conclusion about which set of responses is by default the most 
appropriate.  
 
However, these results also suggest that any conclusions we might draw about the relative 
importance that people place on the different attributes from the responses they gave to the 
‘generic’ questions might be quite different from the conclusions we might draw from their 
responses to the ‘contextual’ questions. So if we take these results along with those reported 
in the previous section it appears that people’s responses to the ‘generic’ questions do not 
serve as reliable proxies for their responses to ‘contextual’ questions. The reasons for this 
mis-match were explored by analyzing the written reasons that participants gave when they 
answered the ‘contextual’ questions.  
 
4) Results of the thematic qualitative data analysis 
Thematic analysis was conducted on the written reasons that participants gave when they 
answered the ‘contextual’ questions. We were particularly interested in gaining insight into 
the reasons why their responses to these questions were different to the ‘generic’ equivalents. 
Hence, the analysis was only conducted on the five pairings shown in Table 3 and Table 4 
which produced significant differences between the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions – 
focusing our attention on the reasons given by those participants who gave very different   14
answers to both questions (i.e., rated A as worse than B in the ‘generic’ version and rated B as 
worse than A in the ‘contextual’ version – or vice versa). 
 
Car Drivers vs. Rail Passengers 
28 of the respondents who switched to rating B (rail passenger deaths) as worse than A (car 
driver deaths) in the ‘contextual’ version gave written comments. The majority of the reasons 
given were linked to the ‘blame’ and ‘quality of life’ attributes that were provided in the 
‘generic’ questions – i.e., that the individuals were not to blame or were helpless (14 cases – 
“Not the individual’s fault” [1005_v1]; “The individual is powerless to influence events” 
[1048_v3]),  the greater suffering of the rail accident victims (6 cases – “Due to the suffering 
that they had more than to who was to blame” [2063_v3]), or the violent nature of the death 
in a rail accident (2 cases – “In rail accidents parts of bodies are found everywhere along the 
railway lines” [1023_v2]). 
 
However, a notable minority of reasons provided seemed to be beyond the scope of the 
attributes presented in the ‘generic’ questions – issues that expressed the view that deaths 
should just not be happening on the railways – i.e., the railways should be safe (10 cases 
“Whilst all travel involves risk, when traveling by train danger is not expected” [1057_v3]), 
and rail accidents should be avoidable (2 cases – “Avoidable by better maintenance of track 
and carriage” [2044_v3]). 
 
Smoking Cancer vs. Asbestos Cancer 
46 of the respondents who switched to rating B (asbestos cancer) as worse than A (smoking 
cancer) in the ‘contextual’ version gave written comments. All of the themes that emerged 
were linked to the ‘blame’ attribute – i.e., that smokers only have themselves to blame   15
whereas the victims of asbestos related cancer were not at fault (29 cases “Smoking is a 
choice so if they are dying from smoking related cancer then its only themselves to blame” 
[1003_v1]; “It was not their fault”[2095_v3]), are unaware of the damage that asbestos 
might cause (17 cases “People were not warned of asbestos damage it could cause” 
[2065_v3]), or that business and government should take responsibility for people’s safety 
regarding asbestos (9 cases “It is the duty of business/ government to lay down guidelines 
concerning asbestos” [1048_v3]). 
 
Car Drivers vs. Pedestrians  
38 of the respondents who switched to rating B (pedestrian deaths) as worse than A (car 
driver deaths) in the ‘contextual’ version gave written comments. Most of the themes that 
emerged were linked to the ‘blame’ (23 cases “Due to the fact that pedestrians are not to 
blame” [1073_v1]), ‘age’ (2 cases “I think this is a vulnerable age group in this type of 
accident and should be given more consideration” [2104_v3]), and ‘number of deaths’ 
attributes (6 cases “I feel B is slightly worse because of the number of deaths” [1029_v3]). 
 
However, a notable minority of reasons provided seemed to be beyond the scope of the 
attributes presented in the ‘generic’ questions – issues that expressed the view that pedestrians 
have the right to feel safe walking the streets (4 cases “It should be safe to walk the streets” 
[2024_v1]) or mentioned the impact of the deaths on other people (2 cases “Although all car 
accident related deaths are tragic to those concerned, it must be especially difficult for those 
grieving when there is someone else who can be held accountable” [2060_v1]). 
 
Work-related Cancer vs. Car Drivers   16
28 of the respondents who switched to rating A (work-related cancer deaths) as worse than B 
(car driver deaths) in the ‘contextual’ version gave written comments. The majority of written 
comments were linked to the ‘blame’ and ‘quality of life’ attributes – i.e., the work-related 
cancer victims had no choice over the situation and their deaths were caused by others (14 
cases “The individuals had no control” [2027_v1]; “Awful, why so many deaths, again due 
to business or government. In scenario B, the car drivers are to blame for the deaths” 
[2113_v2]), or that the work-related cancer victims had greater or longer suffering (10 cases 
“I think A is much worse than B because suffering one-two years before death is more painful 
than to die instantaneously” [2045_v2]). 
 
More generally however, a number of respondents expressed the view that workers should not 
be put at risk in the work-place (10 cases “You should not be put at risk in a work place and 
should be protected by law” [2058_v1]), or that these deaths could have been prevented (3 
cases “Cancer could have been prevented if they hadn’t been exposed to the chemicals at 
work due to the business” [1087_v2]). 
 
CO Poisoning vs. Accidents at Work 
33 of the participants who switched to rating A (CO poisoning deaths) as worse than B 
(deaths in accidents at work) in the ‘contextual’ version gave written comments. The reasons 
given for this pairing were only indirectly linked to the ‘blame’ and ‘quality of life’ attributes. 
They tended to focus on issues of avoidability and neglect rather than who was to blame (21 
cases “Easily avoidable if government funded installing carbon monoxide detectors in homes. 
These deaths are totally unnecessary”  [1128_v3];  “Gas appliances should be checked, this 
is neglect” [2038_v3] ), or the nature of the death from poisoning (2 cases “Poisoning in any 
way or form is in my opinion one of the worst deaths imaginable” [1067_v2]).   17
 
In summary, the qualitative data highlight two main reasons why the ‘contextual’ questions 
produce different responses to the ‘generic’ questions. 
 
The first reason is that the five attributes used to describe the causes of death in the ‘generic’ 
questions may not fully capture the differences between the deaths that participants want to 
take into account when giving their ratings. For example, in the comparison between car 
drivers and rail passengers some of the reasons given picked up on the fact that rail deaths 
were regarded as worse because participants expect the railways to be a safe place or that rail 
accidents are avoidable. The expectation of a safe environment also came into play with the 
pedestrian deaths, and the avoidability issue also came into play with the CO poisoning deaths 
and work-related cancer deaths. The other main issue that may not have been captured by the 
quality of life attribute was some participants’ perceptions of the particularly nasty nature of 
the rail accident and CO poisoning deaths. 
 
The second reason is that the interpretation of the levels used to describe the attributes may 
cover quite a wide range of different situations. This is most clearly illustrated by the 
‘individuals themselves’ and ‘business or government’ levels of the ‘blame’ attribute both of 
which differentiated between the Car Accident vs. Rail Passenger and Smoking Cancer vs. 
Asbestos Cancer pairings. However, it is notable that whereas in the Car Accident vs. Rail 
Passenger pairing more of the reasons for rating the rail passenger deaths as worse than the 
car accident deaths were related to the fact that rail accident victims were not to blame, in the 
Smoking Cancer vs. Asbestos Cancer pairing more of the reasons for rating the asbestos 
cancer deaths as worse than the smoking cancer death were related to the fact that smokers 
were to blame. This suggests that the level ‘business or government’ was regarded as more   18
deserving of a ‘worse than’ rating when it was used to describe rail passenger deaths than 
when it was used to describe asbestos cancer deaths, and similarly the level ‘individuals 
themselves’ was regarded as less deserving of a ‘worse than’ rating when it was used to 
describe smoking cancer deaths than car driver deaths. In other words although participants 
will have accepted that ‘business or government’ was most to blame in the cases of asbestos 
cancer deaths and rail passenger deaths, the actual degrees of business or government 
responsibility might be perceived quite differently by participants for these two types of 
deaths. Similarly participants might perceive the actual degrees of individual responsibility 




Our study sought to establish the extent to which ‘generic’ descriptions where causes of death 
are described merely in terms of their standing on a number of key attributes (age, severity 
and duration of pain and suffering, blameworthiness) are predictive of the response to 
‘contextual’ descriptions where the causes of death are identified.  We find evidence of 
differences in responses between the ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions, but no clear pattern 
as to the direction of these differences.  
 
The qualitative data suggest that two factors led to differing perceptions between the ‘generic’ 
and ‘contextual’ questions.  Firstly, some influential variable(s) were omitted from the 
‘generic’ questions (for example, the ‘violent’ nature or ‘avoidability’ of deaths on the 
railways).  It is possible that the use of a larger number of attributes may have overcome this 
problem. The authors, however, acknowledge the tension between the need to describe the 
totality of influencing factors and the need to arrive at a manageable set of attributes.
(12)    19
 
Secondly, when the causes of death were provided certain categories of included variables 
were interpreted somewhat differently (for example, greater importance seemingly being 
attached to the ‘blame’ dimension in some cases).  Whilst the problem of omitted variables 
can be solved at least conceptually, there is no obvious means of overcoming the finding that 
the interpretation of attributes is context dependent.  Thus, our study highlights the difficulty 
of trying to use a ‘generic’ set of attributes to anticipate people’s responses towards a set of 
attributes where the specific cause of death is identified.  But this, in itself, does not allow us 
to say that one set of values are superior to the other. 
 
As set out above, ‘sensitivity to theoretically relevant factors’ – such as the numbers dying – 
is one criterion against which the validity of responses may be measured (Loomes
(10)).  Whilst 
we found differences in the sensitivity to the numbers of deaths between the ‘contextual’ and 
‘generic’ questions, there was no clear pattern to this finding.  Hence, it is difficult to point to 
any empirical support for the superiority of one set of responses over another.  
 
To explore this issue further, let us consider more carefully the factors that underpin decision 
making. Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
(13) make a distinction between ‘affective’ system and 
‘deliberative’ system for decision making – where affective are based on emotive 
impressionistic reactions, and deliberative involve more systematic weighing up of 
consequences.  For example, Slovic et al.
(14,15)  argue that, in responding to questions 
involving contexts that carry strong negative affect meanings, respondents are less sensitive to 
probability information than contexts that carry less affect.  For example, with hazards like 
nuclear power and exposure to small amount of toxic chemicals, the negative consequences of 
these risks may make respondents more concerned and sensitive to the possibility of these   20
risks, and less sensitive to information about the actual probability of these risks. It could be 
argued that, in such cases, the affective responses – based on emotive impressionistic 
considerations – are ‘distorting’ responses and ought to be ‘factored out’.  
 
Likewise, it is often considered in the health state valuation literature that values for health 
states ought not to take into consideration ‘emotive’ issues, such as those surrounding cancer.   
Rather, health states are generally described in terms of ‘generic’ health state classification 
systems such as the EQ 5D, which involves 3 levels on 5 dimensions (mobility, self-care, 
usual activities’, pain, anxiety & depression).
(16) Leaving aside issues concerning the crude 
nature of the classification systems (and other criticisms of the EQ 5D and other ‘generic’ 
measures), such systems aim to achieve comparability across the range of health care 
interventions in order to aid resource allocation decisions.  It has long been argued (see, for 
example Drummond et al.
(17)) that such decisions ought not to be based on the aggregation of 
the ‘disease specific’ preferences of disparate patient groups as the values are incompatible.  
 
This brings us to the fundamental point that the superiority of ‘generic’ or ‘contextual’ 
valuations may ultimately depend upon the purpose to which the responses are put. If there 
was a desire to use people’s responses about which deaths are particularly bad to inform 
regulatory policy there is certainly something appealing about the health economics argument 
for ‘generic’ measures in order to aid comparability in resource allocation decisions.  It may 
also seem desirable to reject  ‘affective’ in favour of ‘deliberative’ responses. On the other 
hand, the results of our study indicate that the public may well reject the policy implications 
that arise from their own responses to ‘generic’ questions of the type posed here. Likewise, 
the public may well have a genuine desire to save cancer sufferers for reasons that can never 
be captured in any ‘generic’ system, however fully specified.     21
 
In his review of the literature of value elicitation in the fields of health, safety and the 
environment Loomes
(10) suggested that policy makers should generally try to elicit a broad list 
of principals on which to allocate resources from respondents.  The implications of these rules 
should be also shown to respondents, to ensure that they agree with the implications and that 
they cannot find any way to improve well-being.  In this context, the feedback mechanism 
would certainly involve a discussion of the context and example of the types of decisions the 
general rules would dictate.  Were respondents to overwhelmingly reject the implications of 
general rules once the implications of the rules are made clear, the rules would need to be 
revised.  This approach suggests the need for an iterative procedure, similar to a citizen’s jury  
– where rules are revised and adjusted by a panel of lay people, that are consulted and 
reconsulted about appropriate decision rules.  Whether the ‘gap’ between ‘contextual’ and 
‘generic’ rules can be narrowed by such an iterative process has yet to be explored. 
   22
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          Male   154(49.2) 
          Female  159(50.8) 
Age  
          17-34  121(38.7) 
           35-54  97(31.0) 
           55-90  94(30.0) 
           Missing  1(0.3) 
long-term illness, health problem 
or disability that limits daily 
activity or work 
 
          No  253(80.8) 
           Yes  54(17.3) 
           Missing  6(1.9) 
Members of your household with 
long-term illness, health problem 
or disability that limits daily 
activity or work 
 
          No  279(89.1) 
           Yes  28(8.9) 
           Missing  6(1.9) 
 
   25
Table 2:Test-retest reliability check on repeated ‘generic’ question 
 
 %  Response 
 
    
A vs. B 
 
1 2 3 4  Mean  SD  Z
a 
(p) 
Repeated ‘generic’ Question 
(N=306) 
         
(Q6)  10.8 13.1 35.0 41.2 3.07  0.99  Z=0.61 
  (Q21) 6.5  13.2 44.4 35.6 3.09  0.86  (p=.54) 
 
Notes: 
aWilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Table 3: Comparison of responses to ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions 
 
 %  Response 
 
    
A vs. B 
 
1 2 3 4  Mean  SD  Z
a 
(p) 
Car Drivers vs. Rail Passengers (N=306)           
Generic (Q21)  6.5  13.2  44.4  35.6  3.09  0.86  Z=3.48 
Contextual 7.5  10.1 28.8 53.6  3.28  0.93  (p<.001) 
Work-related Cancer vs. Car Drivers (N=205)           
Generic 31.7  36.6  20.5  11.2  2.11  0.98  Z=7.81 
Contextual 61.5  28.8  8.8  1.0  2.49  0.70  (p<.001) 
Smoking Cancer vs. Asbestos Cancer (N=201)           
Generic 20.4  20.4  30.8  28.4  2.67  1.10  Z=4.31 
Contextual 14.4  12.4  21.4  51.7  3.10  1.10  (p<.001) 
Accidents at Work vs. Car Drivers (N=206)           
Generic 37.4  39.8  16.5  6.3  1.92  0.89  Z=0.81 
Contextual 42.2  38.3  10.7  8.7  1.86  0.93  (p=0.42) 
 
Notes: 
aWilcoxon Signed Ranks Test   27
Table 4: Comparison of responses to ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions disaggregated 
for three pairings. 
 
 %  Response 
 
    
A vs. B 
 




Pedestrians vs. Breast Cancer               
Generic               1.6:1  16.0  19.8  39.6  24.5  2.73  1.01  Z=1.39 
1:1.6 11.0  19.0  37.0  33.0  2.92  0.98  (p=.16) 
 ‘contextual’          1.6:1  17.0  30.2  33.0  19.8  2.56  1.00  Z=3.27 
1:1.6 8.0  17.0 42.0 33.0  3.00  0.91  (p<.001) 
Car Drivers vs. Pedestrians               
Generic               1.6:1  19.0  30.0  36.0  15.0  2.47  0.97  Z=4.19 
1:1.6 8.1  17.2 36.4 38.4  3.05  0.94  (p<.001) 
 ‘contextual’          1.6:1  11.0  15.0  45.0  29.0  2.92  0.94  Z=5.00 
1:1.6 1.0  4.0  35.4 59.6  3.53  0.63  (p<.001) 
CO Poisoning vs. Accidents at Work             
Generic               1.6:1  12.3  29.2  38.7  19.8  2.66  0.93  Z=8.47 
1:1.6 0.0  1.0  25.5 73.5  3.72  0.47  (p<.001) 
 ‘contextual’          1.6:1  24.5  30.2  38.7  6.6  2.27  0.91  Z=6.11 




bMann-Whitney U Test 
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Table 5:  Sensitivity to ratios of deaths in ‘generic’ and ‘contextual’ questions 
 
 %  Response 
 
    
A vs. B 
 




Car Drivers vs. Rail Passengers               
Generic (Q21)         1:1  5.0  8.9  37.6  48.5  3.30  0.83  χ
2=11.69 
1.5:1 3.7  13.1 54.2 29.0  3.08  0.75  (p=.003) 
2:1 11.2  18.4  40.8  29.6  2.89  0.96   
 ‘contextual’               1:1  7.9  5.0  21.8  65.3  3.45  0.91  χ
2=8.19 
1.5:1 4.7  9.3  37.4 48.6  3.30  0.83  (p=.017) 
2:1 10.2  16.3  26.5  46.9  3.10  1.02   
Work-related Cancer vs. Car Drivers             
Generic               1:1.5  38.4  34.3  17.2  10.1  1.99  0.98  Z=1.87 
1:2 25.5  38.7  23.6  12.3  2.23  0.97  (p=.062) 
 ‘contextual’          1:1.5  69.7  23.2  6.1  1.0  1.38  0.65  Z=2.34 
1:2 53.8  34.0  11.3  0.9  1.59  0.73  (p=.019) 
Smoking Cancer vs. Asbestos Cancer             
Generic               1.5:1  14.1  15.2  33.3  37.4  2.94  1.05  Z=3.45 
2:1 26.5  25.5  28.4  19.6  2.41  1.08  (p<.001) 
 ‘contextual’             1.5:1  14.1  14.1  19.2  52.5  3.10  1.11  Z=0.05 
2:1 14.7  10.8  23.5  51.0  3.11  1.10  (p=.96) 
Accidents at Work vs. Car Drivers             
Generic               1.5:1  34.0  42.5  20.8  2.8  1.92  0.81  Z=0.62 
2:1 41.0  37.0  12.0  10.0  1.91  0.96  (p=.54) 
 ‘contextual’             1.5:1  44.3  38.7  11.3  5.7  1.78  0.86  Z=0.96 




bMann-Whitney U Test   29


















Over 60 year olds 
 
 
Over 60 year olds 
Quality of life in period 
leading up to death 
 
A bit worse than normal for last 
1-2 years of their lives 
A lot worse than normal for last 
1-2 years of their lives 
 
Who is most to blame 
 
 
The individuals themselves 
 
Business or Government 
      
What do YOU think? 
 
A is much 
worse than B 
A is slightly 
worse than B 
B is slightly 
worse than A 
B is much 
worse than A 
( t i c k   o n e )               
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A: Work-related Cancer 










 15  deaths 
25 deaths 
A: Smoking Cancer 
B: Asbestos Cancer 
50 deaths 
25 deaths 
 15  deaths 
10 deaths 
A: Accidents at Work 
B: Car Drivers 




A: CO Poisoning 
B: Accidents at Work 
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